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THE MIND-BODY WORLD-KNOT
Jesper Kallestrup
Here Kallestrup presents a succinct introduction to
some of the latest thinking about the notorious mind-
body problem.
The mind-body problem is about how to find a place for
consciousness in a world that is entirely composed of aggre-
gations of physical entities. We can take an entity to be phys-
ical just in case it counts as physical by best physical theory,
where this is understood very broadly as comprising physics,
chemistry, biochemistry, physiology, neurology, etc. This
problem has seemed intractable for centuries. Schopenhauer
(The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
(Illinois: Open Court Publishing 1847/1974): §42) famously
called it a “world-knot”. It consists of two problems: the first is
about mental causation and the second is about phenomenal
consciousness. We will present it as a Hegelian dialectical
set-up: Section I defends the thesis that mental properties are
identical to physical properties. Section II defends the anti-
thesis that mental properties cannot be identical to physical
properties. Finally Section III sketches some syntheses that
resolve the conflict between the thesis and the anti-thesis –
some ways of unsnarling the knot.
I
We are all familiar with the idea of one property causing
another. You strike a bottle with a baseball bat. What caused
the bottle to shatter? Not the colour or the price of the bat.
These properties are causally irrelevant. If the bat had had a
different colour or a different price, the bottle would still have
Shattered. What matters is the mass or density of the bat. Its
being made of metal rather than paper made the difference.
doi:10.1017/S1477175608000365 # 2009 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental properties such
as believing it’s going to rain and desiring not to get wet
never cause behavioural properties such as staying inside.
Mental properties are caused by properties of the immediate
physical environment. The rain hitting the window through
which you are looking causes your belief that it rains
outside. But this view has it that mental properties are in
turn causally impotent. That’s highly implausible by any reck-
oning. For instance, the causal explanation of my staying
inside in terms of believing that it’s raining and desiring not
to get wet would be false were this view true. Or consider
my judgement that I am in pain or I am having a visual
experience of something yellow. If such mental properties
were causally inefficacious, they would be explanatorily irre-
levant to my judgements about them. Here’s Jerry Fodor:
. . .if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally
responsible for my reaching, and my itching is causally
responsible for my scratching, and my believing is cau-
sally responsible for my saying. . . if none of that is lit-
erally true, then practically everything I believe about
anything is false and it’s the end of the world.1
We better thus think of mental properties as having causal
powers to bring about behavioural properties. In fact,
mental properties also have causal powers to bring about
other mental properties. Think of my pain causing not just
withdrawal behaviour but also a desire for pain-relief.
Circumstances may in actual fact never be suitable for the
manifestation of these powers but that’s irrelevant. A sugar
cube remains water-soluble even if never immersed in
water. Call this:
Mental Causation: Mental properties cause beha-
vioural properties
If epiphenomenalism is false, there’s a compelling argu-
ment to the effect that mental properties are identical to
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physical properties of the brain. By ‘identity’ we mean
numerical identity, just in the same way that Superman is
identical to Clark Kent. There’s only one man there. But
before addressing that argument we need to reflect on two
key principles. The first is called:
Completeness: Every physical effect has a sufficient
physical cause
What this means is that the physical world is causally
closed. If you take any caused physical property and trace
its causal ancestry or posterity that will never take you
outside the physical domain. You will never need to appeal
to mysterious alien properties or spurious spiritual forces.
Contemporary physical science sustains Completeness; or
so we are told. Here’s an example. At the end of August
2005 an intense low pressure area was formed over warm
ocean waters in South Eastern Bahamas. Water vapour
evaporated from the ocean surface, and caused a tropical
storm to become the hurricane Katrina. When it hit the
American Gulf Coast it caused catastrophic flooding
several kilometres inland. Consequently New Orleans is
now steadily sinking into the mud of the Mississippi Delta
causing economic recession. The second is called:
Exclusion: No effect has more than one sufficient
cause
If a property had two distinct sufficient causes, it would be
causally overdetermined. And while there may be some
rare cases of such overdetermination – think of two assas-
sins independently and simultaneously shooting a
convict – it is incredible that all mental causation is like
that. For instance, if a property had two distinct sufficient
causes, that property would also have two independent
and complete causal explanations. But if one cause is
capable of fully accounting for that property, there’s no
explanatory work left for the other putative cause to do.
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Imagine a detective telling you the following regarding the
circumstances of Mrs X’s death: Mr X had a motive, the
opportunity was clearly there, the murder weapon has his
finger prints all over it, Mr X’s DNA was found on Mrs X’s
body, and no one but Mr X was anywhere near Mrs X
when she was fatally attacked. We find little room for the
thought that Mr Y could also be the murderer of Mrs X,
having a different motive, using a different murder weapon,
and so on.
Given these two principles, we can now mount an argu-
ment that mental property M is identical to physical property
P. It’s a proof by contradiction. First we assume for the
sake of argument that M and P are distinct. Then we derive
a contradiction. Contradictions are always false. So, given
that our argument is valid, we conclude that our assumption
is false. A valid argument is one that must have a true con-
clusion if all the premises are true. Note also that B in the
argument is a behavioural property. Consider:
The Exclusion Argument
(1) M and P are distinct properties (Assumption)
(2) M causes B (Mental Causation)
(3) B has a sufficient physical
cause P
(Closure)
(4) B isn’t caused twice over by
M and P
(Exclusion)
(5) So, M and P are identical
properties
Here’s an example. Neuroscientists tell us that pains and
nociceptive-specific neuronal activity (NNA) are correlated.
Whenever you are in pain your brain has this physical
property. Now suppose for the sake of argument that these
two properties are distinct. Mental Causation tells us that
your pain causes your arm to withdraw, say from the
burning candle. Closure then says that there must be a
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physical cause, NNA as it happens, sufficient to bring
about that withdrawal behaviour. Remember, we are count-
ing that behaviour as physical. But Exclusion then rules
out that both pain and NNA could be causes of the move-
ment of your arm. For these two properties are assumed to
be distinct, and no effect has more than one sufficient
cause.
Note finally that although we have taken M, P, and B to
be properties, we could equally well think of them as sub-
stances. In that case, we would have an argument that
mental substances are identical to physical substances.
While a physical substance has at least one physical prop-
erty, a mental substance is one with only mental properties.
Think of ectoplasm or ghost-stuff. Descartes famously
advocated substance dualism according to which each of
us is a composite of two distinct such substances: a phys-
ical body located in space and our thinking mind located
outside space. But he was well aware of the problem about
mental causation facing this view. In an important exchange
of letters with Descartes, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia
first put this objection by asking:
‘. . .how the human soul can determine the movement
of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform volun-
tary acts—being as it is only a conscious substance’.2
In response (op. cit.) Descartes remarked that it’s simply an
empirical fact that mind and body do unite and interact, some-
thing that we learn from everyday experience, and he
suggested that we have an innate idea that allows us to com-
prehend how they interact, and together constitute a unity. Not
many contemporary philosophers subscribe to substance
dualism, but some are convinced that property dualism is
true. It’s striking that any kind of dualism – any view according
to which there are two essentially distinct kinds of things in the
world – is targeted by the Exclusion Argument. Jaegwon Kim
(Mind in a Physical World (1998), p. 38) calls it Descartes’
revenge! He shows that it poses a challenge even for those
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property dualists who hold that mental properties are in some
strong sense determined by physical properties.
II
So much for the thesis. Let’s now turn to the anti-thesis,
which negates the thesis. In Meditation VI Descartes offers
a so-called conceivability argument for substance dualism:
I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly under-
stand can be made by God just as I understand it.
[. . .] I have, on the one hand, a clear and distinct
idea of myself taken simply as a conscious, not an
extended, being; and, on the other hand, a distinct
idea of body, taken simply as an extended, not a
conscious, being; so it is certain that I am really dis-
tinct from my body, and could exist without it.
Note how Descartes relies on two principles:
Conceivability: If something is clearly and distinctly
conceivable, then God ensures that it is possibly the case
In other words if what seems to be the case meets a
certain condition, namely that of being clear and distinct,
then God vouches for its genuine possibility. The idea that
suitably constrained conceivability is a reliable guide to
possibility is also expressed by Hume (A Treatise of Human
Nature: I. ii. 2) albeit without invoking divine intervention:
Whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the
idea of possible existence, or in other words, that
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.
The second is the logical principle called:
Leibniz’s Law: If two things are identical, then they
have all the same properties.
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Thus if my mind is identical to my body, and my body has
the property of being divisible, then so must my mind.
Consequently, if my mind doesn’t have that property, but
my body does, then my mind is distinct from my body.
Is Descartes’ argument cogent? Take the Superman
story. Superman is Clark Kent although Lois Lane doesn’t
know (prior to their marriage) that Superman is identical to
Clark Kent. Suppose she argues like Descartes: I have a
clear and distinct idea of Superman as a flying hero, and a
clear and distinct idea of Clark Kent as a non-flying non-
hero. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God
can so create. So, Superman isn’t identical to Clark Kent!
Something has gone wrong. But Leibniz’s Law is impec-
cable. Or rather once we ensure that the relevant properties
are genuinely individuating properties, applying Leibniz’s Law
cannot lead us astray. Suppose Lois Lane reasons as follows:
I know that Superman fights for the American way. I don’t
know that Clark Kent fights for the American way. So,
Superman and Clark Kent are distinct. What’s wrong with this
reasoning is that what Lois Lane knows or fails to know about
Superman aren’t properties that individuate Superman. They
are rather properties that Lois Lane has. Contrast with the fol-
lowing: Superman fights for the American way, but Clark Kent
doesn’t, so Superman is distinct from Clark Kent. Now there’s
no fault with the reasoning, but the second premise is false.
Clark Kent does fight for the American way.
But how can we trust Conceivability? Despite God’s
alleged omnipotence even He cannot separate what is
identical to itself. If Superman is identical to Clark Kent,
then Superman is necessarily identical to Clark Kent.
There’s just one man in the fable and he couldn’t possibly
be someone other than whom he is. Call this:
Identity: If a and b are identical, then a and b are
necessarily identical
But it also seems obvious that we can have a clear and dis-
tinct idea of Superman as a flying hero, and a clear and
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distinct idea of Clark Kent as a non-flying non-hero. So, it
looks like something is amiss with Conceivability. Descartes
himself invoked God to ensure that his Evil Demon wasn’t
deceiving him about its reliability. But the existence of God
was supposed to follow in part from this principle, and so God
cannot then in turn safeguard its reliability. This is the
Cartesian circle: you can know that whatever is clear and dis-
tinct is true only if you first know that a non-deceiving God
exists, but you can know that a non-deceiving God exists only
if you first know that whatever is clear and distinct is true.
Compare with: I can only get a scholarship if the University
has already accepted me, but the University can only accept
me if I already have a scholarship.
But the fact that Conceivability is flawed doesn’t mean
there’s no other tight connection between what is conceivable
and what is genuinely possible. In fact there better be such a
connection – otherwise we would be cognitively screened off
from the realm of such possibilities. Here’s an example. Pigs
don’t actually fly but that’s not necessarily so. We can
imagine circumstances where both the gravitational force and
the physical constitution of pigs are sufficiently different.
There’s nothing incoherent in that thought. After all Newton’s
law of gravitation already tells us that as an object moves
away from the surface of the Earth, the gravitational force
decreases. But then we would want to say that given the right
changes in the laws of physics and matters of particular fact,
pigs might have flown. That’s a genuine way things might
have been. Note also that we need to idealise on conceivabil-
ity. Someone might think they can conceive of married bache-
lors. They can do so only if they aren’t paying sufficient
attention or don’t fully master the concept of a bachelor. On
this background, consider the following revision:
Conceivability*: If something is conceivable on ideal
reflection, then it is possibly the case
Let’s turn to psychophysical identities. There’s a very strong
case for the claim that we can ideally conceive of, say, pain
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without NNA and of NNA without pain. We need only envi-
sage a zombie: a being that is physically just like us from
the skin in but nevertheless lacks consciousness. There’s
nothing it is like to be a zombie. It’s all dark inside. We can
even imagine the zombie being a functional duplicate of us:
she behaves in every way just like we do when we are in
pain and so on. This sets our zombie aside from
Hollywood ‘zombies’. The bioengineered replicants in the
science fiction film Blade Runner from 1982, for instance,
are mere proximate duplicates of adult Humans, e.g. they
lack certain emotional responses when subject to a Voight-
Kampff test. If they were perfect functional duplicates,
viewers would never be able to tell the difference! We can
call this:
Zombie: Psychophysical identities are conceivably
false
Using Descartes-style reasoning we can now mount an
argument to the effect that no mental property M is identi-
cal to a physical property P. Again, it’s a proof by contradic-
tion. First we assume for the sake of argument that M and
P are identical. Then we derive a contradiction. So, given
that our argument is valid, we conclude that our assumption
is false. Consider:
The Conceivability Argument
(6) M is P (Assumption)
(7) If M is P, then M is necessarily P (Identity)
(8) It’s conceivable that M isn’t P (Zombie)
(9) So, it’s possible that M isn’t P (Conceivability)
(10) So, M isn’t P
Let’s spell out the step from (9) to (10). If it’s possible that
M isn’t P, then it’s not necessary that M is P. But (7) says
that M is P only if M is necessarily P. So, if it’s not necess-
ary that M is P, then M isn’t P. Take our test case. Suppose
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pain is NNA. If pain is NNA, then pain is necessarily NNA.
There’s only one property and it is necessarily self-identical.
But you can conceive even on ideal reflection of NNA
without pain. So, it’s possible that NNA isn’t pain. But then
it’s not necessary that pain is NNA. And so it’s not the
case that pain is NNA. This completes our anti-thesis.
III
We have so far canvassed two valid and prima facie
plausible arguments. While the Exclusion Argument con-
cludes that mental properties are identical with physical
properties, the conclusion of the Conceivability Argument is
just the opposite. Mental properties obviously cannot both
be identical with and distinct from physical properties. So,
given that our reasoning is faultless, at least one of the
underlying principles has got to be flawed. Which one(s)?
There has recently been much discussion about the plausi-
bility of:
Completeness: Every physical effect has a sufficient
physical cause
and
Exclusion: No effect has more than one sufficient
cause
Some philosophers, e.g. McLaughlin3, have argued that
denying Completeness needn’t entail commitment to any
kind of mysterious alien properties or spurious spiritual
forces. On this view, a mental property is best seen as an
emergent property: a genuinely novel kind of property of a
whole consisting of parts of an old kind that emerges, not
because something from the outside is added, but when
those parts are put together in the right kind of way.
Crucially, the causal powers of an emergent property are
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irreducible to the causal powers of the lower-level proper-
ties on which it, in some sense, depends.
According to emergentism, our world is a layered world:
there is a hierarchy of distinct yet connected levels start-
ing from the physical level. Specific to each level, there
are distinct kinds of substances wholly composed of kinds
from lower-levels all the way down to elementary material
particles. Each kind has specific properties in virtue of a
characteristic organizational complexity, and some of
these properties will have emergent causal powers. What
is more, there are special emergent laws, neither reduci-
ble to, nor derivable from, lower-level laws, which attribute
these causal powers to the types of properties in
question.
The problem with this view is how upward determination
from the physical to the mental can be combined with
downward causation from the mental to the physical? My
headache causes a desire for pain-relief. Presumably both
my headache and my desire are determined by distinct
physical states of my brain – call them P1 and P2 respect-
ively. How can my headache act directly on P2 without
there being some other neuro-physiological causal influ-
ences? It would seem more natural that P2 is sufficiently
caused by P1. It’s true that if I desire to relieve my head-
ache, I have to act on P1. There is no direct way – via tele-
pathy, telekinetics, or what have you – that I can ease my
mental condition without intervening in my brain processes.
That’s why I take an aspirin. I know that in the right circum-
stances being an ingested aspirin is causally sufficient for
relieving my discomfort. So my desire causes my behaviour
in conjunction with my belief that aspirin normally has this
effect. But what acts on P1 are properties of the aspirin
rather than my desire for pain-relief and my belief that
aspirin will do the trick.
Other philosophers have aired misgivings about
Exclusion, which says that no effects can have two distinct
sufficient causes. Or rather they have typically argued that
a slightly different principle has counterexamples:
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Exclusion*: If a property F is causally sufficient for
another property G, then no distinct property F* is
causally relevant to G
Take Yablo’s pigeon Sophie4 who is trained to peck at red
cards to the exclusion of cards of other colours such as
blue or yellow. A red card is produced and Sophie pecks it.
The question is: what caused Sophie to peck? The first
answer that comes to mind is: the redness of the card. But
of course no card is red without being red in a particular
way, say, scarlet or crimson or some other shade of red. In
this case, being scarlet is the specific way in which the
card is red. Moreover, being scarlet is causally sufficient for
Sophie’s pecking. But this does not mean that the redness
of the card is causally irrelevant to the pecking – as
Exclusion* would have it. The reason is that if Sophie had
not been presented with a scarlet card, but with a crimson
card, she would still have pecked. Sophie will peck as long
as she is shown a card that is some shade of red. And
that’s why being red is a causally relevant property despite
the fact that whatever shade of red is shown will be cau-
sally sufficient.
This may all be true, but it doesn’t affect our argument.
The Exclusion Argument rests on Exclusion, but not on
Exclusion*, and Sophie’s pecking is no counterexample to
Exclusion.
There’s a lot more to say about both Completeness and
Exclusion, but let me instead focus on the anti-thesis, and
in particular on:
Conceivability*: If something is conceivable on ideal
reflection, then it is possibly the case
which to my mind is the least plausible of all the principles.
If we can successfully reject this principle, then we can
block the inference from (8) to (9) in the Conceivability
Argument. In order to reject this principle we need an
account of why certain statements are impossible even
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though they are conceivable, and so in some sense seem
possible. Think of the statement that pain isn’t NNA. What’s
called for is some way of explaining away an appearance
of possibility as a mere appearance.
At this point some philosophers, e.g. Tye5, avail themselves
of so-called phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts
are essentially distinct from physical concepts. The concept
of NNA and the concept of pain refer to the same state, but
while one can possess the former physical concept without
having had an experience of pain, one can possess the latter
phenomenal concept only if one has had such an experience.
Phenomenal concepts pick out the characteristic phenomenal
character associated with the relevant experience. We
acquire the phenomenal concept of pain when we undergo
an experience of pain, attend to its phenomenal character via
introspection, and then form a conception of what it’s like to
have that experience. Alternatively, some prefer to build
experience-dependence into the justification conditions of
phenomenal concepts rather than their possession con-
ditions. This means that we are justified in applying such
concepts only if we are either undergoing a phenomenal
experience of the right kind, or alternatively is recreating it in
imagination. Either way, the main point is that there is no cor-
responding experience-dependence built into any conditions
of physical concepts. One can thus justifiably apply a physical
concept without having or imaginatively recreating any par-
ticular experience.
On this background consider now our psychophysical
identity:
11: Pain is NNA
where ‘Pain’ is assumed to express the phenomenal
concept of pain, and ‘NNA’ expresses the physical
concept of NNA. Now we can explain why 11 gives rise
to an impression of possible falsity without actually being
possibly false. To entertain 11 means to deploy a
phenomenal concept, hence it involves a version of the
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experience. But it also means to exercise a physical
concept, which involves no such experience. Given that
the phenomenal concept includes something experiential,
which the physical concept leaves out, entertaining 11
makes us wonder why this particular mental state is iden-
tical to that particular physical state, rather than some
other physical state, or maybe no physical state at all.
That is, 11 gives rise to an impression of possible falsity.
But this impression is misleading. For the physical
concept may fail to activate the experience and yet refer
to it. Just as the concept of pain refers to the phenomenal
character associated with experiences of pain, so does
the concept of NNA. The same concept cannot have two
distinct referents, but two distinct concepts can have the
same referent. Think of the concept of Superman and the
concept of Clark Kent as both referring to the same man,
namely Superman.
Note finally certain limitations on this strategy of
explaining away appearances of possibility. It seems to
Lois Lane that Superman might not have been identical
to Clark Kent. What then is she conceiving if not that
that man might not have been self-identical? In this case
there are no phenomenal concepts in play. One promising
answer is to say that Lois Lane identifies the same man
in two distinct ways, and those ways might have identified
two distinct men. To wit, she conceives of circumstances
in which the invulnerable superhero that flies around is
distinct from the shy reporter that works for the Daily
Planet. Lois Lane confuses this genuine possibility for the
merely seeming possibility that Superman isn’t Clark
Kent. In this case a seeming possibility is explained away
by another genuine possibility, but in 11 the phenomenal
concept strategy allows us to explain away a seeming
possibility without having to invoke some other genuine
possibility.
Jesper Kallestrup is Lecturer and Senior Tutor in
Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
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